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Text of Statutes

Unlted States Cons tltutlon, Amendment Six:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the
right
to a speedy
and
public
trial, by an
Impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be
Informed
of
the nature
of
the
cause
of
the
accusation;
to be confronted
with
the
witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses In his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel In his defense.
Un 1 ted States Cons tltutlon Four th Amendment:
The right of
the people
to be secure
In
their
persons,
houses,
papers
and
effects
against
unreasonable searches
and
seizures, shall not be
violated
and
no warrant
shall
Issue
that upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 12, Utah State Constltutlon:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have
the
right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature
and
cause
of
the
accusation
aglanst him,
to have a copy thereof, to testify in
his own behalf, to be confronted
by
the
witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an
impartial
jury of
the
county or district In which the offense is alleged to
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases.
In no
instance
shall
any accused
person,
before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein
guarnateed.
The

v

accused
shall
not be compelled
to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall
not be compelled
to
testify
against
her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor
shall
any person
be
twice
put
in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Article It Section 14, Utah State Constitution:
The right of the people against unreasonable searches
and
seizures,
shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to
be searched and the person or things to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-23-3:
Conditions precedent to Issuance: a. A search warrant
shall
not issue except upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation
particularly
describing
the
person
or place
to be searched, and the persons,,
property, or evidence to be seized.
Utah Code Anno ted, Sec tlon 77-1-6
(1) In criminal
prosecutions
the
defendant
is
en tltied:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or
by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of
the accusation
filed
agains t him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against
him;
(e) To have compulsory
process
to insure
the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy
public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district where the offense
is
alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial
within

30
days after a r r a i g n m e n t If unable to post ball and
If the business of the court p e r m i t s ,
(2) In a d d i t i o n :
(a) No person shall be put twice In jeopardy for
the same o f f e n s e .
(b)
No
accused
person
shall,
before
final
judgment,
be
compelled
to advance money or fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution
or
the
laws
of
Utah,
or
to pay the costs of those rights
when received;
(c)
No
person
shall
be
compelled
to
give
evidence against h i m s e l f ;
(d)
A
wife
shall
not be compelled to testify
against her husband nor a husband against
his
wife;
and
(e)
No
person
shall
be
convicted
unless by
verdict of a jury, or upon a plea
of
guilty
or
no
contest,
or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, In case
of
an
Infraction,
upon a judgment by a m a g i s t r a t e .

vii
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 890544-CA

RICHARD ALVIN LIKES,
Appellant/Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for burglary of a
business, a third degree felony.

Proceedings were held in the

District Court in and for Millard County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The owner of Fillmore Diesel received a tip from an anonymous
caller telling him his business would be broken into on the evening
of May 17, 1988.

(T 125) He notified the police of this and they

agreed to watch his business on the night in question.

(T 81)

They checked it periodically throughout the evening.

(T 82)

On

one of the checks, they discovered the building had, in fact, been
burglarized.

(T 84)

The police notified the owner of Fillmore Diesel.
consulting with a "Confidential

After

Informant" the police believed

appellant was the guilty party.

The police presented

their

information to the Justice of the Peace, Ronald R. Hare. A search
warrant was issued authorizing the search of appellant's residence.
(Suppression Hearing T. 3 L. 17)
Based on the evidence found at appellant's residence, he was
arrested.

Arrested with appellant was co-defendant Nield. At the

Trial, the prosecution introduced the evidence

(a bolt cutter)

obtained during the search of the residence.
The prosecution also introduced the statement against interest
of the appellant.

(Trial T. 221 L. 15 —

T. 223 L. 2)

Appellant

present at the Trial and exercised his right not to testify.

The

appellant requested that his" admission against interest be suppressed as it was not a voluntary statement.
this question

Hearing was had on

(T. 203-219) at which time the Court denied the

Motion To Suppress, but also restricted the appellant's right to

2

complete

cross-examination

admission.

of

the

officer, who

obtained

the

(T. 219)

The appellant also moved the Court to suppress evidence (bolt
cutters) , seized under a defective search warrant.

(R. 26)

The

basis therefore being that the warrant failed to particularize the
property to be seized.

The identification of the property to be

seized was limited to "shop equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk
calculator, auto tools stolen from Gerald Freeman."

The officer

picked up the bolt cutters sought to be suppressed, took them to
the alleged victim Freeman, and then made the determination to
seize the bolt cutters.
T. 17 L. 9-13)

(Suppression Hearing T. 14 L. 9-14; also

This notice to suppress was denied by the Trial

Court.
No

particular

completed.

inventory

of

specific

property

had

(Suppression Hearing T. 4 L. 16 and T. 6 L. 12)

been
No

specific particular description was given as to "shop equipment"
nor "air tools".

(Suppression Hearing T. 8 L. 2-13)

cutter had no distinguishing marks.

(T. 10 L. 21-25)

The bolt
The actual

identification of the bolt cutter by victim Freeman was one to two
days later.

(Suppression T. 36 L. 1-5)

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The defendant was tried and convicted by a jury. The jury was
allowed

to hear

the

appellant's

admission

against

interest.

Appellant was present but exercised his right not to testify full
cross-examination

of the officer obtaining

the admission was

denied.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the accused
the right to confront his accusers.

Without the opportunity to

cross-examine, the Supreme Court of the United States, and followed
by the Utah Supreme Court, have determined a conviction cannot
stand.
The admission against interest was coerced from the appellant
by the manner of his handling of the investigatory officer, and
misrepresentation of the officer.
The

warrant

authorizing

the

search

of

the

appellant's

residence failed to particularize the property to be seized.

The

terms "shop tools" or "auto tools" stolen does not sufficiently
guide the officers in his search and seizure of property.
The conviction of the appellant must be reversed.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
In the process of a Trial, the accused is guaranteed certain
rights under the Constitutions of both the United States and Utah.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . .
(emphasis added) United States Const. Amend.
VI.
In one of the earliest decisions where the Court went into
detail on the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the Court discussed
the purpose behind its enactment.
The primary object of the constitutional
provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination of the witness, in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and Judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief. Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339 (1895).
5

The right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him.
A major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is
to give a defendant charged with crime an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses against him. Pointer v. State of Texasf 380
U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065.
Introducing appellant's admission against interest at Trial
without the opportunity to fully cross-examine the officer who took
such admission is precisely what the Sixth Amendment is designed
to protect. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 1074, 85 S.Ct. 1074.
In Douglas, the defendants were charged with assault with intent
to murder.

They were tried separately.

The defendant, Lloyd was

tried first and found guilty. At Douglas' Trial, the State called
Lloyd as a witness against Douglas.

Lloyd refused to testify and

invoked the privilege of self-incrimination.

Under the guise of

refreshing Lloyd's recollection, the prosecution questioned Lloyd,
asking him to confirm or deny statements read by the prosecutor
from

a document purported

to be Lloyd's

statements inculpated Douglas in the crime.

confession.

These

The Court held that

Douglas' inability to cross-examine Lloyd denied Douglas the right
of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause.
6

In 1959, the Supreme Court ruled a co-defendant's confession
could be introduced into evidence by the prosecution.

This would

not violate the Sixth Amendment as long as the Judge gave the jury
an instruction to only use the co-defendant's against the one who
confessed.

Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct.

294.
Eventually the Court recognized the fallacy of this reasoning
and expressly "overrule [d] Delli Paoli and reverse [d]".

Bruton v.

United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, at 1622.
The government should not have the windfall of having the jury
be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter
of law, they should not consider that which they cannot put out of
their minds. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by

instructions

to the

jury all practicing

lawyers

recognize as unmitigated fiction, ^Ld* (citing cases).
The Court cited

with approval

Judge Learned

Hand, "The

limiting instruction is a 'recommendation to the jury of a mental
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody
else's."
1983)".

Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2nd Cir.
Bruton v. United States, at 138, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1629.

7

To attempt to force the jury into segregating evidence into
separate intellectual boxes.

Determining a confession is true

insofar as it admits that A has committed criminal acts with B, and
at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that
B has committed those criminal acts with A an impossible task.
"Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an accused of
the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law."
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 405, 85 S.Ct. at 1068.

1

The Bruton holding, not allowing the introduction of a codefendant's confession without a right to cross-examine, has been
2
discussed in great detail in the cases which followed the decision.
A co-defendant's confession when used against the defendant
is analogous to a compelled confession. "[i]t is now axiomatic
that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of
law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an
involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of
the confession". Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774
(1964) . Without the opportunity to cross-examine co-defendant
Nield. Appellant Likes was denied due process of law as well as
the right to confront his accusers.
2
An exception to the rule established in Burton is notcontrolling but should be noted.
The Court will allow the
admission of the co-defendant's testimony at Trial even if the
person who confessed is not present. Provided the accused was
given the opportunity to cross-examine the confessor at a Preliminary Hearing. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930
(1970) .
8

Clarifying why the right to confront a witness is so important , the reasons cited by the Court are: (1) to insure the witness
will give his statements under oath (2) forces the witness to
3
submit to cross-examination,
(3) permits the jury deciding the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making
his statement, aiding the jury in assessing credibility. California v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1985 (1070).
The cases following Bruton are collected in the most recent
case where the Supreme Court has discussed these issues.
Richardson v. Marsh
(1987).

U. S.

See

, 107 S.Ct. 1702

4

In Richardson the Court carved out a narrow exception to the
Bruton rule.

After extensively discussing

holding of Bruton.

the reasoning and

The Court found it is not applicable in all

situations. "We hold that the Confrontation Clause is not violated
by the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession with
a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is

"The greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth". 5 Wigmore Section 1367.
4
The analysis of the court, in Bruton, for the holding; is
summed up very forcefully by the dissent at 1709-14.
9

redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any
reference to her existence."

Icl. at 1709 (emphasis added).

The Court also made it clear that before a statement is to be
affected by the Bruton requirement that it be subject to crossexamination, it must be powerfully incriminating and expressly
implicate the defendant.

Id., at 1707.

Clarifying its position that Bruton is still good law subject
only to a narrow exception.
immediately

after

The Court in the case reported

Richardson v. Marsh

held, a co-defendant's

interlocking testimony cannot be admitted against a defendant in
a joint Trial, unless it is admissible under Bruton.

"We hold

that, where a non-testifying co-defendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant,
see Lee v. Illinois, 106 S.Ct. 2056

(1986), the Confrontation

Clause bars its admission at their joint Trials, even if the jury
is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even
if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him."
Cruz v. New York,

U.S.

See

, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1719

(1987).
At the appellant's Trial, his admission against interest was
introduced.

The confession was not "redacted" so as to reduce the
10

"express implication" and "powerfully incriminating" force of its
introduction.

Richardson v. Marsh, at 1707.

STATE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
In deciding the extent of the rights guaranteed to an accused
under the Sixth Amendment, the Utah Courts have followed the United
States Supreme Court's decision and declined to expressly decide
the issues presented under Article I Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.

5

State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987) See also

State v. Kendricks, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975).
Ellis was not a case which directly implicated a Bruton issue
because the testimony which implicated the defendant was not a codefendant's confession, the testimony was offered by a police
officer testifying at Trial as to the defendant's statements during
arrest, and the statements did not directly implicate the defendant
in the commission of the crime, ^d. at 190.
The Court discussed the defendant's contentions in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings.

It is clear the law in Utah

under the Sixth Amendment is controlled by Bruton*
5
See footnote 1, supra.
For a collection of the cases which following the Bruton
rational, and the subsequent development of a more precise rule
see Ellis at 190.
IT

The Utah Supreme Court is also willing to allow a co-defendant's testimony

in to convict a defendantf

provided the co-

defendant is present at Trial and subject to cross- examination.
State v, Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited
therein).
In Kendricks , the Supreme Court faced a problem similar to the
one presented by this case,

A defendant's alleged accomplice

refused to testify at Trial. The State then introduced the alleged
accomplice's testimony at the accomplice's previous Trial.

The

defendant objected claiming the introduction of said testimony was
a violation of the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights
to confront witnesses against him.
In Kendricks , the Court held that the right of confrontation
could not be violated.

The Court cited the provisions of Section

12 of Article I of Utah Constitution, the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and also Section 77-1-8 of the Utah Code
Annotatedf

which

provided

that

in criminal

prosecutions

the

defendant would be entitled to be confronted by the witnesses
against him.

Said section has been repealed and replaced by the

provision of Section 77-1-6.

12

The new provision provides that the defendant shall have the
right to be confronted by witnesses against him.
The Court in Hendricks found that the right of confrontation
is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair Trial. The right
of confrontation is based upon the notion that the accused should
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
The Court found that the defendant had no opportunity to confront
the co-defendant, nor did his counsel have the opportunity to
cross-examine him.
The case was reversed and remanded for new Trial. It is also
interesting to note the language of the Court in its holding:
While it is likely that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict against the
defendant, nevertheless we cannot appraise the
effect upon the jury of the reading of the
testimony of Travis in these proceedings. We
are of the opinion that it was prejudicial
error to permit the testimony of Travis to be
read into the record in this case as no sufficient foundation had been laid to justify its
admission.
While attempting to balance the problems recited above the
Court allowed the appellant's admission against interest.

And

compounded the error by limiting appellant's right to full crossexamination of the investigating officer who secured the admission.

13

POINT II
The appellant contends that the admission against interest
used against him at the Trial was taken by the investigating
officer in violation of his rights not to testify against himself,
as found in Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitutionf and
Section 77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated. He alleges that the admission
was coerced and not voluntary.

Such a determination requires an

analysis of the facts pertinent to this case.

The transcript of

the Suppression Hearing is short, pages 203 through 215. And the
appellate Court is asked to review this testimony.

The appellant

points out these factors which show coercion rather than consent:
1. Appellant was arrested at 1:30 a.nu
2.
Appellant was held in custody and then
taken to jail at approximately 2:30 a.m.
3. After arriving at jail he was entered into
a booking procedure which may have gone to
3:30 a.m.
4. Appellant was not intoxicated, but appellant was placed in the jail drunk tank.
5.
Appellant was not given bedding as a
blanket or pillow, and could not sleep,,
6. Interrogation of the appellant began at
1:00 p.m. without inquiry into appellants
condition, as rest he had received.
7. The interrogating officer threatened the
appellant with the words "had enough material
to put him away forever if he didn't talk".
8.
The interrogating officer lied to the
appellant stating he had confidential statements implicating appellant in the subject
burglary, when in fact no such statements
existed.
14

9.
The interrogation lasted for three and
one-half hours without a break.
At the conclusion of this three and one-half hour interrogation appellant gave an admission against interest.

However, this

admission was soon retracted, and appellant has continued to deny
his implication in this crime.
POINT III
A search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform
to the particularity
unconstitutional.

requirement

of

the Fourth Amendment is

Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468, U.S. 981, 104

S.Ct. 3424. A warrant must particularly describe the things to be
seized, as well as the place to be searched.

Dalia v. United

States, 411 U.S. 258, 99 S.Ct. 1682 (1969).
In State v. Gallegos 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), the Supreme
Court reviewed a search warrant for the seizure of "all controlled
substances and stolen property."

While searching the home, the

officers noticed a Magnavox VCR attached to a television set and
two video tapes close by. The officer asked the defendant Gallegos
about them and Gallegos remarked that he had rented them from
Norton's supermarket.

The officer then called the police dis-

patcher and asked her to verify this information with Norton's.
An assistant manager at Norton's advised
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the dispatcher that

Norton's had not rented the VCR to Gal legos based on the fact that
there was no rental agreement on file with the name of Gallegos.
This inquiry took ten to fifteen minutes.

After receiving the

information, the officer examined the VCR and discovered that the
serial number was missing.

The defendant and his girlfriend were

unable to produce a rental receipt for the VCR and the officer
seized the VCR and the tapes.
(The officer in Gallegos did as the officer in the instant
case did.

He seized the evidence to see if he could connect it

with a crime.

Such conduct is the exact act which the Fourth

Amendment seeks to deter and prohibit.)
The following dayf the officer called several stores in the
Provo area trying to determine if the VCR was, in fact, stolen.
Eventually the ownership of the VCR and the tapes were traced to
another store, Sounds Easy.

(This fact is similar to Officer

Cory's seizure of the property and then checking later with Mr.
Freeman to see if it was stolen property.)
The

Court

found

that

the

particularity

of

description

requirement of the Fourth Amendment is essentially a proscription
against general warrants whereby administrative officers determine
what is and what is not to be seized.
1G

The decision to seize must

be judicialf as opposed to administrative/ and a warrant must be
sufficiently particular
intended

to be

to guide the officer to the property

seized, thereby

minimizing

the danger

of. an

unwarranted invasion of privacy.
Defendant suggests that the property to be seized must be set
out in the warrant previous to its issuance and not decided on an
"after the fact" basis by the officer and the alleged victim as was
done in the Gallegos and the instant case.
Regarding the use of generic terms in the search warrant, the
Utah Court, citing State v. Namen, Alaska App.f 665 P.2d 557
(1983), held:
Without substantial justification, warrants
describing property only in generic terms
(terms applicable to an entire class of property) are not favored by law. However, use of
such descriptions have been allowed when a
more specific description of the thing to be
seized is unavailable. Thus, general descriptions have been held sufficient in cases
involving contraband such as drugs . . . in
cases where the inherent nature of the property south by a warrant precludes specific
description . . . in cases where attendant
circumstances prevented a detailed description
from being given . . . and in cases where
detailed description has been difficult and
the evidence established that the stolen good
sought are likely to be part of a larger
collection of a similar contraband located at
the premises to be searched. (Emphasis added).
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The Utah Court found that the description '"stolen property"
was unconstitutionally deficient.
"obvious"

that

the

Fourth

The Court found that it was

Amendment's

requirement

for

"pa-

rticularity" was abridged in that case.
An officer does not have unbridled discretion when conductinga search of a residence to determine what property is to be seized;
such a decision is for the judiciary.

The officer is limited by

the warrant and he has no authority except by its terms.

Thus,

generic descriptions allowing the officer to decide what should be
searched, and then seized, are not favored. Here, the officer had
to seek out the owner to decide whether the property had been
stolen and then decide what should be seized.

The decision to

seize was not determined byu the warrant but by the officer.
General warrants to investigate and rummage are unconstitutional.
Clearly, the property

to be

seized

as

"stolen property" is

unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently describe the
property and allows an officer unbridled discretion.

State v.

Gallegos.
The next issue is whether

the application

of a generic

description (air tools, shop tools, or auto tools) is sufficient
to save the warrant meeting the particularity requirement.
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The

general premise of the law is that generic descriptions do not
suffice and are not favored.

State v. Gallegos, State v. Namen.

The search warrant herein identifies the property in only
generic terms, i.e. "shop equipment, air tools, . . . and auto
tools stolen from Gerald D. Freeman, Fillmore Diesel, Fillmore,
Utah, on 5/17/88, during a burglary, and any illegal controlled
substances".

An inventory was being or had been completed of the

items stolen from the Fillmore Diesel by Mr. Freeman (Mr. Freeman
was unclear as to when he had completed the inventory) .

Said

inventory itemized the property stolen as to the particular tool
or instrument with specificity.
Officer Scott Corey testified that he went to the residence,
picked up all shop equipment, air tools, and auto tools, and then
took them to Mr. Freeman for his identification as to which would
be stolen property, similar to what was done in Gallegos, wherein
the officer sought out stores to see if the VCR was stolen. After
Officer Corey picked up all items that fit within the generic term
"shop equipment, air tools, and auto tools", Mr. Freeman reported
that none of the property had been stolen excepting possibly the
bolt cutters.

The bolt cutter is not particularly identified by

Mr. Freeman since it is not distinguishable from any other bolt
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cutter by mark or identifiable sign. There exists the question of
whether

"bolt

cutters"

fall

within

the

definition

of

"shop

equipment".
Appellant submits that the exceptions noted in Gallegos do not
apply here:

(1) The items to be seized are not contraband such as

drugs; (2) The inherent nature of the property is not such that it
precludes a more specific description.

In factf an inventory was

being preparedf itemizing the particular tool or instrument? (3)
%The attendant circumstances did not prevent a more detailed
description.

The inventory was being completed; (4) A detailed

description would not have been difficult nor was it stolen goods
likely to be part of a larger collection of a similar contraband
located at the residence. Consequently, defendant submits that the
general proposition that generic descriptions are not favored
should be followed and that the Court should find that no exception
as defined by the Utah Court has been met.
The Court in Gallegos cited United State v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730
(5th Cir. 1981) in support of the proposition that generic terms
in warrants are generally prohibited by law.

In Cook the items to

be seized were VCR cassette tapes. The description in the warrant
allowed

seizure

of

illegally

obtained
20

VCR

tapes

(the actual

description is not included due to its length and it being of
little value to this determination).
The Federal Court in Cook propounds again the premise that the
use of generic terms is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. In Cook the
Court held that the warrant was constitutionally flawed. The Court
found that the warrant's use of generic terms in providing for the
seizure of "illegally obtained films . . . not limited to the
motion pictures described in the affidavit" provided the searching
agents with little guidance and was unconstitutional.
The appellant herein suggests that Cook bears relevance to the
instant case due to the similarity of the description supplied in
both of these warrants.

In Cook the warrant provided for the

seizure of "stolen VCR tapes" and in this case the warrant provided
for the seizure of "stolen tools".

The Court in Cook held that

such a description was generic in nature and therefore unconstitutional and the Court should find the warrant in this case to be
unconstitutional for the same reasons.
In Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557 (Alaska App. Ct. 1983), the
Court found that the specificity at which the search warrant is
directed serves to protect against possibilities of a general
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exploratory search and assures that articles of property outside
the legitimate scope of a warrant are not subject to mistaken
seizure.

These exact dangers existed in the present case.

Search warrants describing property only in the generic terms,
that is, in terms generally applicable to the entire type or class
of property rather than specific items, are disfavored in the
absence of substantial justification.

Unlike contraband, such as

narcotics, there is nothing about the nature or physical characteristics of stolen property that renders it inherently identifiable as being stolen; thus characterizations of property in search
warrants as having been stolen at a given time or from a given
place will not normally suffice to satisfy the requirements of particularity,

since

such

characterizations

do

not

enhance

the

officer's ability to distinguish between property unlawfully held
that is subject to seizure and property of a general class that is
lawfully held and not subject to seizure.
In Namen, the Court found that the search warrant for the
defendant's residence did not satisfy the constitutional requirement.

The Court found that an inventory could have been made

available and that a description of the property to be seized as
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jewelry stolen from a particular residence on a particular date is
not constitutional.
The facts of Namen parallel the facts present in Cook and the
present case.

Descriptions of stolen jewelry, stolen VCR tapes,

or stolen tools or equipment from an alleged victim on a particular
date are unconstitutional because they do not limit the officer or
give him any guidance in the limits of his search.
The Court in People v. Coletti, 39 Misc. 2d 580f 241 NY. S.
2d 454 (1963) , found that the terms "stolen furniture and household
goods" are generic terms and deficient. See also State v. Kealoah,
613 P.2d 645 (Hawaii 1980).
The State and Federal Constitutions both require that a
particular description be set out in a search warrant to limit and
assist the officer executing the warrant.

Warrants must specifi-

cally describe the property to be seized or they are unconstitutional.

The officer has no authority except through the warrant.

Therefore, we start with the presumption that generic terms
are disfavored. Warrants containing generic terms are to be upheld
only if one of the exceptions as set out above are met. It is the
defendant's position that the warrant in this case contains generic
terms and does not fall under any of the exceptions.
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Pursuant

thereto, the defendant asks this Court to declare the warrant
unconstitutional and to suppress the evidence seized under said
warrant.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court committed reversible error by admitting the
appellants coerced admission against interest.

Likewise, further

error was made in admitting the bolt cutters which were seized
under a faulty search warrant.

These errors were then compounded

when the Court limited the appellants right to cross-examine a
States witness on materials clearly prejudicial.

This was an

attempt to avoid violations of the co-defendants rights, and the
result was that error was committed.

The conviction should be

reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of January, 1990.

Attorney For Richard Likes
Appellant/Defendant
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